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Abstract
With increasing applications of revenue management, airline companies often
oversell their tickets. This practice is controversial because some passengers
would not be able to board when the number of show-up customers exceeds
the available seats. And this might make the aected customers upset and
thus aect the future revenue of the airline. In this paper, we propose a new
mechanism - a call-back auction, in which the passengers are asked to submit
a bid to indicate the compensation they would like to receive for giving up
their seats and changing their original ight schedule. This could provide the
airline with information to select passengers with the lowest compensation
requirements and also reduce the negative impact on customer relationship.
We develop a model with booking limit decision and examine the impact of
this call-back auction mechanism on the airline's protability and compare
it with other existing mechanisms such as xed-price compensation. We nd
that our mechanism can lead to higher prot for the airlines in most cases.
In this study, pricing issues are also examined.
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Notation
We use the following notation throughout this thesis:
a : Low-fare booking limit in the rst period
pL : Low-fare ticket price
pH : High-fare ticket price
DL : Random demand of the low-fare passengers
DH : Random demand of the high-fare passengers
c : Fixed capacity of the ight
~d : The reserve delay cost vector, ~d = fd1; d2; :::; dng is used to denote
the reserve delay cost for the total n low-fare passengers.
d : Upper bound of the random delay cost
SL(a) : Actual sales in rst period, SL(a) = minfDL; ag




It is believed that ticket booking strategy, as well as pricing decision, is the
most important marketing strategy for airline companies to stimulate ticket
sales so as to reduce the chance of ying unoccupied seats. Since the source
of airplane seats is limited, airlines have to determine the ticket booking
strategy throughout the planning horizon, with the objective to satisfy a
wide range of passengers in dierent periods.
With the development of research in revenue management and its applica-
tions, overbooking strategy is recommended by a lot of experts and has been
adopted as a standard procedure by more companies in the civil aviation
industry, since selling tickets in excess of actual capacity can greatly reduce
the probability of ying empty seats. Benets of this strategy are often mea-
sured by the increase in ticket sales volume because it is common knowledge
that some passengers will cancel their ights before departure. Therefore,
selling more tickets than the capacity helps airline companies enhance the
seat utilization rate of the aircraft.
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Although the overbooking strategy enhances ticket sales, this practice
may sometimes create troubles to the airline company and passengers, caus-
ing inconvenience to both parties, For example, when the number of show-up
passengers exceeds the available seats on board, some unlucky passengers
will inevitably get bumped, even some of them are reluctant to give up
their tickets due to some important commitments. Recently, it is reported
that airline companies become more aggressive in using overbooking strat-
egy, causing more denied boarding. Whenever overselling occurs, an airline
needs to refuse some passengers from boarding their ight. This practice also
upsets the passengers, especially those who are unwilling to get bumped.
In view of this, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 1 requires
that each passenger who is denied boarding involuntarily should be paid an
on-the-spot payment compensation. The amount depends on the price of the
ticket and the length of the delay: If the delay is within one hour and the
airline company arranges substitute transportation to bring the passengers
to their destination, no compensation is required. If the delay is between
one and two hours (between one and four hours on international ights) and
the airline company arranges substitute transportation, the airline must pay
an amount equal to 200% of one-way fare to the destination, with a $650
maximum. If the delay is more than two hours (four hours internationally)
and the substitute transportation is scheduled, the compensation doubles
(400% of the fare, with $1300 maximum).
But DOT dose not say how much the airline has to give to volunteers,
this may give the airline a chance to nd the passengers who are willing
1Please refer to the overbooking policy in \Consumer Guide to Air Travel "by Depart-
ment Of Transportation at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/publications/yrights.htm
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to give up their tickets in exchange for some compensation. The idea of our
scheme is to introduce reverse auction mechanism to identify those passengers
who least mind getting bumped and they are willing to wait for a delayed
ight. Delta has already implemented a similar airfare selling scheme: when
the passengers check in for their ight, each passenger is asked whether she
(we will refer to a passenger as \she "in our paper) is willing to take another
ight in case that someone needs to be bumped from an overbooked ight, in
exchange for a voucher with a specied amount submitted by the passenger.
(See Figure 1.1, which is the screenshot of the pop-up window of Delta's
check-in page). This bidding mechanism can help the airline to retrieve some
tickets when there are more show-up passengers than the capacity on board
by choosing the volunteers with the lowest compensation requirements.
There are several advantages of bumping voluntary passengers comparing
to involuntary ones. First, bumping volunteers can save the airline company
some money, since usually volunteers may not require as much compensation
as passengers who are forced to give up their seats. Besides, the auction
mechanism can make the boarding process go more quickly and smoothly
because the airline can select the volunteers immediately after passengers
submitting bids instead of looking for volunteers at the departure gate. Fur-
thermore, under this scheme, the airline company can extend its overbooking
limit further, without worrying too much about the compensation paid to
the bumpees.
Therefore, we believe the overall outcome of our scheme is ecient. The
reverse auction mechanism not only reduces the compensation cost of denied
boarding caused by overselling, but also helps those voluntary passengers to
3
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Figure 1.1: Screenshot of the Pop-up Window of Delta's Check-in Page
be identied and oered a deal they would accept, greatly diminishing the
chance of involuntary bumping. As a result, both companies and passengers
are better o under this mechanism.
In the following section, we want to show the description of operation
under our proposed basic model. An airline company sells air tickets to
two kinds of passengers coming in two periods. We assume that low-fare
passengers, who are exible with their schedule, come in the rst period,
while high-fare passengers, who usually arrive in the last minute, come in
the second period. When the low-fare passengers purchase the tickets in the
rst period, they will submit a bid to the airline, indicating the compensation
level they are willing to accept if getting bumped. Under this scheme, airline
4
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company has the rights to retrieve some tickets from the rst-period sales, if
the number of arrival passengers in the second period exceeds the remaining
capacity after rst-period sales. The airline pays the voluntary bumpees the
amount they desire through their bids in exchange. The passengers' demand
is a random variable following a particular independent distribution, such
as uniform or Poisson distribution. Our model is evaluated on the basis of
the expected revenue earned by the airline, and the objective of the model
is to identify an optimal booking level for rst-period passengers so as to
maximize the expected revenue.
It can be shown in this paper that expected revenue, which is expressed as
a function of low-fare booking limit, is unimodular in booking limit. Hence
the optimal booking limit can be derived by applying the rst order condition.
Our numerical simulations suggest that benets from implementing the call-
back auction mechanism can be signicant comparing to a benchmark case
without the call-back option.
We then expand the basic model to the case of two decision variables, in
which the high-fare price is also considered as a decision variable. The high-
fare price inuences the random number of high-fare passengers coming in
the second period according to a particular form of demand function. We also
use numerical examples to show the benet derived from implementing the
call-back auction mechanism comparing to the benchmark case. The numer-
ical examples suggest that the performance of call-back auction mechanism
relative to benchmark case improves in the two-decision model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next chapter
provides a literature review, and in Chapter 3, we introduce the concept of
5
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call-back auction in the airline industry and compare the call-back auction
with the xed-price compensation mechanism. The eect of introducing a
call-back auction to the basic two-period air ticket booking model is analyzed
in Chapter 4. We present the equilibrium bidding strategies of passengers
under both uniform and rst-price auction mechanisms. We also compare
the call-back auction to the xed-price \callable products"mechanism as well
as the basic two-period booking model. We are able to show that call-back
auction performs much better when mean values of demands are relatively
low and the dierence between low-fare and high-fare prices is not signicant.
Besides, we will prove revenue equivalence theorem here in the call-back
auction mechanism. An alternative information structure in which the airline
releases the realized number of random demands to the passengers before they
submit their bids is also discussed. Chapter 5 describes extensions of our call-
back model with two decision variables in which an airline can also determine
the high-fare price in addition to the booking limit. Chapter 6 summarizes




Revenue management is an active area of research. The comprehensive re-
views of the broader literature on revenue management can be found in
McGill and van Ryzin (1999), Bitran and Caldentey (2003), and Talluri and
van Ryzin (2004). Classical research in revenue management started from
Rothstein (1971), who was the rst one to establish a model for determin-
ing airline overbooking policies. Littlewood (1972) proposed that discount
fare bookings should be accepted as long as their revenue value exceeded the
expected revenue of future full-fare bookings. The eld of revenue manage-
ment has been greatly developed after the work done by Belobaba (1987,
1989), which introduced the seat inventory control component for airlines to
increase revenue. In recent years, development of revenue management has
progressed from simple single leg control, through segment control, to origin
destination control. Examples can be found in Smith et al. (1992), with de-
cision focusing on overbooking, discount allocation and trac management.
A number of papers have studied the airline optimal booking problem
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under dierent settings. Wollmer (1992) studied a model with lower fare
classes booking rst, and that airline has the decision to refuse booking re-
quest, and presented an algorithm that maximizes the expected revenue.
Chatwin (1999) modeled the reservation process as a continuous-time birth-
and-death process, in which fares received and refunds paid are continuous
functions of time with a terminal-value representing the bumping penalty
at the end of planning horizon. They concluded that a piecewise-constant
booking limit policy is optimal. Subramanian et al. (1999) formulated a
Markov decision process for airline seat allocation on a single-leg ight with
multiple fare classes. They took cancelation and no-shows into consideration,
and demonstrated that a state- and time-dependent booking limit for each
fare class is optimal. Leder et al. (2002) modeled passenger show-up behav-
ior as a binomial random variable, and solved for the optimal overbooking
strategies under dierent forms of bumping function. Church et al. (2003)
developed a model taking into account empty seats and rejected passengers.
They maximized prots while also minimized loss in service quality by using
Taguchi Quality Control method. Ge et al. (2011) considered a model with
\transference"method, which allows some of the overowed passengers result-
ing from overbooking to board on a later ight with certain compensation.
They showed that when it is properly implemented, airline company could
enjoy reduced uncertainty and improved revenue and the optimal transfer-
ring quantity among ights of dierent departure times can be determined.
Except for the airline's revenue, there are other criteria used to determine
the overbooking policy. Shlifer and Vardi (1975) presented a model using the
following three criteria: the probability of a rejection, the expected rejection
8
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level that does not exceed given limits, and the loss incurred by rejecting a
passenger relative to the prot of carrying one.
In our scheme, we use reverse auction to call back tickets from the low-fare
sales. Auction theory serves as a theoretical foundation of the ticket retrieval
system. The book written by Krishna (2002) provids a detailed survey of the
models and results in this eld. Klemperer (1999) also gave an illuminating
literature review in auction theory, which included several seminal papers
in this area, such as Vickrey (1961), Myerson (1981) and many others. For
multi-unit auction, Maskin and Riley (1989) examined the optimal selling
mechanism under multi-unit auctions.
The mechanism that we investigate is a combination of reverse auction
and airfare booking system together. The application of reverse auctions
in revenue management has been extensively studied from dierent perspec-
tives previously. Vulcano et al. (2002) developed a single-leg multi-period
revenue management model in which the seller uses auctions to sell its prod-
ucts, whereas consumers act strategically and bid for units of a xed capacity
over time. The seller decides how many units to put on sale in each period.
Van Ryzin and Vulcano (2004) considered a joint inventory-pricing problem
in which buyers act strategically and bid for units of product over an innite
horizon, and they were able to characterize the optimal auction and replen-
ishment policy for this problem. Caldentey and Vulcano (2007) analyzed a
seller facing a Poisson arrival stream of consumers operates an online mul-
tiunit auction with each consumer submitting a bid to maximize his own
surplus. Huh and Janakiraman (2008) also studied a periodic-review inven-
tory replenishment problem using auction as a sales mechanism, they showed
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that the (s, S) policy is an optimal replenishment policy.
The work most closely related to ours is Gallego et al. (2008). They
were the rst to introduce the \callable products"mechanism to the airline
industry to increase the potential revenue. This mechanism grants the airline
company the right to recall the tickets at a xed compensation pre-specied
by the company before passengers buy the tickets. They showed that callable
products provide a riskless source of additional revenue to the airline com-
pany, especially when high-fare demand uncertainty is high. In addition, the
optimal recall price and optimal discount-fare booking limit can be deter-
mined by applying the rst order condition. \Callable products"is similar
to \exible products", which is dened by Gallego and Phillips (2004). A
exible product, which is a menu of two or more alternatives oered by the
supplier used in the booking process, grants sellers the right to assign cus-
tomers who purchase a \exible products"to one of the alternatives at the
end of the booking process. \Flexible products "can be applied in the airline
industry, in which passengers are assigned to one of the ights serving the
same route before boarding.
In addition to the \callable products"mechanism, there is another remedy
to solve this problem | \Overbooking Auction Plan", raised by Simon and
Visvabhanathy (1977), in which each passenger writes a sealed \bid"of the
lowest amount she is willing to accept in return for getting bumped for a
later ight. They also did an empirical investigation at the airport to nd the
relationship between bid amounts and waiting time, but none of the analysis
showed any important relationships. However, they did not provide any
model formulation or analytical results. Hence we further extend their idea of
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implementing a reverse auction for airlines to retrieve tickets by formulating a
model and providing the optimal solution to it. Nagarajan (1978) conducted
a survey to nd out that there may be a good number of passengers who are
willing to accept relatively small amounts to wait for the next ight. Arthur,
Malone and Nir (2002), also did a project to study optimal overbooking
policy in various settings. In one of their models, they used auction methods
to search for volunteers to get bumped. They were able to approximately
simplify the expected compensation function using auction method, however,
no much result was derived based on it.
Although sharing many similarities with the \callable products"mechanism,
auction mechanism diers in several respects. The rst dierence is the ad-
ditional exibility of passenger in our mechanism, which allows each low-fare
passenger to submit a bid to reect their cost of delay. This gives rise to the
research question whether the airline and passengers will be better or worse
o comparing to the \callable products"mechanism as well as traditional
overbooking mechanism without call-back option. To answer this question,
we conduct a numerical study to assess the dierence in performance among
these three mechanisms. The results of the study indicate that call-back auc-
tion mechanism also provides a riskless source for airline to enhance expected
revenue. Furthermore, the numerical results show that our mechanism might
perform better than the \callable products"mechanism in terms of expected
revenue of the airlines under certain conditions.
The second main contribution of our paper is the analysis of the pas-
sengers' equilibrium bidding behavior under dierent types of auction. By
doing so, we are able to characterize the resulting game structure between
11
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passengers and the airline, which is absent in the Simon and Visvabhanathy's
overbooking auction solution. We have improved Simon and Visvabhanathy's
idea by introducing a game structure into the overbooking auction model,
in which passengers act strategically to maximize their own prots given the
private types of delay cost while the airline determines its booking limit in
anticipation of the passengers' decisions.
The third contribution of our paper is that we introduce a concept called
\delay cost", which measures the volunteers' expense of waiting time spent at
the airport plus the eort of arranging substitute transportation themselves.
Hence, passengers can exhibit her level of bumping expense through the
bid she submits. Then airlines can discriminate exible passengers out of
non-exible passengers based on the submitted bids, and oer those exible
passengers enough compensation in exchange for tickets, resulting in a more





The call-back auction is a mechanism for airlines to hedge against uncertainty
in future high-fare demand. When the airline implements call-back auction
mechanism, the sequence of events occurs as follows:
(1) The airline publishes both low-fare price pL and high-fare price pH
before two types of passengers arrive.
(2) The airline announces the call-back auction type (i.e., rst-price or
uniform price auction) and determines the booking limit a for low-fare
passengers before the arrival of low-fare passengers.
(3) The low-fare passengers DL arrive. When these passengers purchase
tickets, they must submit a bid to indicate the compensation they want
to receive for being selected as volunteers to give up their tickets. The
low-fare bookings are accepted until the booking limit a is reached.
13
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(4) At the end of rst period, the realized number of low-fare sales is the
minimum between the realized value of low-fare random demand DL
and the low-fare booking limit a, that is SL(a) = minfDL; ag.
(5) At the beginning of second period, high-fare passengers arrive. The
remaining capacity after the rst period sales is c  SL(a). The airline
accepts high-fare ticket bookings, with its realized value denoted as
DH .
(6) If the realized number of high-fare demand exceeds the remaining ca-
pacity, it triggers the event that airline needs to implement call-back
auction to retrieve some tickets from low-fare passengers before depar-
ture, in order to fulll the high-fare booking requests.
(7) The low-fare volunteers whose tickets are called back get the amount
of compensation based on the auction type and their submitted bids.
This process is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
In our model, we assume that the airline will not arrange later ight, so
the compensation is a lump-sum payment to the volunteers who get bumped.
Alternatively, the airline can also choose to arrange a delayed ight to bring
the volunteers to the destination in addition to the compensation.
3.2 Implementation
In this section, we will discuss how the airline install such a ticket call-back
auction mechanism into its ticketing and boarding system. When the low-
fare passengers buy the tickets online, a screen will pop up on the computer,
14





































SL(a) passenger submit bids
Airline determine a
Figure 3.1: Call-back Auction Process
informing the passengers that the airline will use a specic type of auction
(rst-price or uniform price) to call back some tickets when overselling oc-
curs, and solicit bids from low-fare passengers to indicate the amount of
compensation they desire. One example of this pop-up screen is the pop-
up window appears when passengers purchase tickets of Delta airline online,
asking passengers to submit an amount of compensation voucher for getting
bumped. (See Figure 3.2)
We assume that before submitting bids, the low-fare passengers know
the distributions of low-fare and high-fare demands. After the high-fare
passengers arrive, the airline gets the information of the realized number of
high-fare demand. There are following three cases concerning the high-fare
15
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Figure 3.2: Pop-up Screen to Solicit Bids from Passengers
demand realization:
(1) When the high-fare demand is no more than the remaining capacity,
there is no need to call back the low-fare tickets. All the low-fare
passengers can check in for their ight, and the bids submitted become
useless.
(2) When the number of high-fare demand is between the remaining ca-
pacity and total capacity, the airline will collect the tickets proceeding
from the lowest bidder, until the required number of tickets is achieved.
The volunteers will be notied of being selected before checking in for
the ight and they will get an amount of compensation based on his or
16
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her bid and the auction type.
(3) When the high-fare demand is more than the total capacity, a screen
will pop up on the check-in computer, informing the low-fare passengers
that all the low-fare tickets will be called back, with each passenger
getting a compensation equal to the upper bound of the delay cost.







No auction is 
needed
The m low-fare passengers are 
selected, and each low-fare 
volunteer get the compensation 
Airline knows the 
information of number 
of tickets needed 
m=(SL(a)+DH-c)
All low-fare tickets 
will be called back 
Each low-fare passenger get 
a compensation equal to the 






passengers can check 
in for their flight
Airline company announces the 
auction type and fare prices
Figure 3.3: Implementation of Call-back Auction Mechanism
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From the previous description, it is not hard for the airline companies to
implement call-back auction mechanism. In the scheme raised by Simon and
Visvabhanathy (1977), when the passengers check in, the airline agent can
distribute among the ticket-holders an envelope and a bid form, instructing
each of them to write down the lowest sum of money she is willing to accept
in return for getting bumped from the oversold ight. Then the airline agent
would simply proceed from lowest bidder upwards until the required number
of bumpees is achieved. Low-fare bidders would be given the amounts they
bid whereas all other passengers y as scheduled.
Nowadays, instead of using an envelope to conduct the silent auction,
airline can use a computer-aided system to nd volunteers. Airline company
can add a pop-up screen in their online ticket-selling system to notify passen-
gers the low-fare tickets will be called back using a specic type of auction
(rst-price or uniform price) once overselling occurs, and ask passengers to
submit bids. Then the bids submitted by the passengers will be collected
and sent to the ticket sales agents for review and selection. The passengers
with lowest bid levels will be chosen until required number of tickets is met,
and the result will be published and delivered to those aected passengers
before boarding. Voluntary bumpees then get their compensation and nd
alternative transportation by themselves.
Under the call-back auction mechanism, exible passengers can take this
opportunity to earn some money by changing their schedule. Also, it saves
some passengers' time spending at the gate preparing to board. Moreover,
the airline can solicit the volunteers earlier before boarding to avoid incon-
venience, eliminating the time wasted at the gate selecting bumpees.
18
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A Two-Period Model with
Call-back Auction
Consider a model in which an airline wants to sell tickets of a ight with xed
capacity c in two periods, in which the low-fare passengers come in the rst
period while high-fare come in the second period. The low-fare demand DL
and the high-fare demandDH are random variables with distribution function
FL() and FH(). Also fL() and fH() are used to denote the density function
respectively. Each low-fare passenger has a delay cost ~d, which is private
information to each passengers and drawn from a common distribution ().
The airline determines a booking limit a for the low-fare passengers coming
in the rst period, therefore the sales of low-fare demand can be denoted as
SL(a) = minfDL; ag.
The airline also announces the specic type of call-back auction in ad-
vance to sales of tickets, and each low-fare passenger submits a bid according
to her delay cost di and the type of auction. The low-fare passengers are also
19
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notied that the compensation is a lump-sum payment, and airline will not
arrange substitute ights to bring them to destination before they submit
their bids, which is the same as the assumption in xed-price compensation
model by Gallego et al. (2008).
In the second period, the capacity available for sale at high-fare is c  
SL(a). Once the realization of high-fare demand DH exceeds the remaining
capacity, m = SL(a)+DH c low-fare tickets need to be called back. The
volunteers selection procedure and compensation level will be based on the
type of auction mechanism announced by airline company.
The performance of our air-ticket call-back auction mechanism is mainly
evaluated by the expected revenue earned by the airline, and the objective
is to determine an optimal booking limit for the low-fare passengers.
We will consider the auction type of both uniform price and rst-price
auction, which dier in compensation to each selected passenger. Later, we
further analyze the call-back auction with a reserved compensation level,
which adds an upper bound to the compensation level for each volunteer.
To start our analysis, we make the following several assumptions through-
out our analysis:
(1) The random delay cost ~d of each low-fare passenger is uniformly dis-
tributed between pL and d, in which d is the upper bound of the delay
cost.
(2) Booking limit in the rst period can not exceed the capacity of the
ight, i.e. a  c. Given this assumption, there is no overbooking for
the low-fare passengers in the rst period.
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(3) All the bookings of low-fare passengers will show up, there is no can-
celation or no-shows in this model.
(4) When the high-fare random demand is greater than the capacity DH >
c, all the low-fare sales will be called back with each passenger gets a
compensation equal to the upper bound of the random delay cost d.
Hence, the call-back auction is inactive in the case when all the low-fare
tickets are called back.
4.1 Uniform Price Call-back Auction
In this section, we consider the uniform call-back auction mechanism. The
uniform call-back auction considered here is equivalent to a multi-unit sealed-
bid auction in which, if SL(a) ticket holders bid for m volunteer quotas
when the realization of high-fare random demand DH exceeds the number of
remaining capacity c SL(a), then the m ticket holders with the lowest bids
win the auction and the compensation paid to the winners is the (m + 1)th
lowest bid. All of the participating low-fare passengers know their own delay
costs before submitting their bids, thus the optimal bidding strategy for the
low-fare passengers is characterized as a bidding function (), and is stated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1.1. It is weakly dominant for each passenger to bid her
private delay cost truthfully in a uniform price call-back auction, that is
(d) = d.
Proof. Suppose the airline needs to call back m (m = (DH (c SL(a)))+)
tickets that have been sold in the rst period. Then for passenger i with
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delay cost di who submits a bid b, we argue that compared with b < di and
b > di, bidding b = di yields no worse payo.
We use b
(j)
 i to denote the j
th lowest bid submitted by (SL(a)   1) com-
petitors. Assume that the other (SL(a)   1) low-fare passengers follow the





If b < di, we have the following 3 situations:
(i) d
(m)
 i  b < di, passenger i is not selected as a volunteer, hence bidding
truthfully makes no dierence.
(ii) b < d
(m)
 i  di, passenger i is selected as a volunteer but suers a
negative payo. Hence bidding truthfully makes her better o.
(iii) b < di < d
(m)
 i , passenger i is selected as a volunteer. It makes no
dierence if she chooses to bid truthfully.
If b > di, we have the following 3 situations:
(i) d
(m)
 i  di < b, passenger i is not selected, hence bidding truthfully
makes no dierence.
(ii) di < d
(m)
 i  b, passenger i is not selected. But if she were to lower
b to di, then she would make a positive payo by being selected as a
volunteer.
(iii) di < b < d
(m)
 i , passenger i is selected, and it makes no dierence if she
chooses to bid truthfully.
Thus, we have argued that in the uniform price call-back auction it is
weakly dominant strategy for a passenger to bid truthfully.
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When all the low-fare passengers follow truth-telling strategy when they
submit bids, the expected revenue function of the airline can be derived into
a closed-form expression. First, we dene the following expected revenue
function R(i), which denotes the expected revenue given the actual sales in
the rst period is i:
R(i) = pL i+
c iX
j=0



























pH c  d i















fH(j) + d i (1  FH(c))

:
where d(m+1) is the delay cost of the (m + 1)th lowest bidder, and the rst
and second term represent the low-fare and high-fare sales respectively, while
the last term denotes the expected compensation payment resulted from the
call-back auction. We have the following property for the function R(i).
Lemma 4.1.2. The expected revenue function R(i) is concave in i.
Proof. Before the proof, we dene the rst and second order dierence of
function R() with respect to argument i for the subsequent analysis:
R(i) = R(i+ 1) R(i)
2R(i) = R(i+ 1) R(i):
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Take the second order dierence of R(i) with respect to i yields:
2R(i) =   d 1
i+ 1









(c  j)(c  j + 1)fH(j)
#
< 0:
Lemma 4.1.2 is used to derive the property of the expected revenue func-
tion under the low-fare demand uncertainty, which is denoted by E [R(SL(a))].
Hence, the expected revenue function of the airline using call-back auction










= pL SL(a) +
cX
j=0
pHjfH(j) + (1  FH(c))
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(i+j c) (i+j c+1) d+(c j)pL fH(j)  d i[1 FH(c)]# fL(i);
where the rst two terms represent the expected sales in two periods, whereas
the last two terms represent the expected compensation to the volunteers.
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Lemma 4.1.3. The expected revenue function E [R(SL(a))] is unimodal in
decision variable a.
Proof. Taking the rst order dierence with respect to a yields:
E [R(SL(a))] = R(i+ 1) R(i)
= R(a)fL(a)  fL(a)R(a) + [1  FL(a)]R(a)
= [1  FL(a)]R(a);
in which the rst term is greater than zero and the second term is decreasing
in a from lemma 4.1.2, hence R(SL(a)) is unimodal in a.
Therefore, by applying the rst order condition R(a) = 0, we can obtain
the optimal low-fare booking limit.
Proposition 4.1.4. (Optimal Booking Limit)
Define a0 =
(










0 if a0 < 0
a0 if 0  a0  c
c if a0 > c:
This proposition demonstrates that the optimal low-fare booking limit a
is independent of the low-fare random demand distribution and the high-fare
price pH , although both of them inuence the optimal expected revenue level
of the airline.
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In addition, we dene C(j) as the expected compensation payment func-
tion to volunteers given the realization of high-fare demand is j:
C(j) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if 0  j < c  SL(a)
(SL(a)+j c) (SL(a)+j c+1) d+(c j)pLSL(a)+1 if c  SL(a)  j < c
d  SL(a) if j  c:
Lemma 4.1.5. The expected compensation payment function C(j) is increas-
ing convex in j.





> 0 if c  SL(a)  j < c





> 0 if c  SL(a)  j < c
0 if j  c:
Lemma 4.1.5. depicts the fact that the total compensation level increases
faster in the number of required low-fare volunteers.
Uniform Case
We study a simple case where both the high-fare and low-fare random
demands are uniformly distributed between 0 and c. Thus the realization
of the high-fare demand will not exceed the capacity of the ight, so the
situation when all the low-fare tickets are required to be called back will not
occur. We can show that under uniformly distributed random demands, the
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expected revenue function can be simplied as:






















(j+a c) (j+a c+1) d+(c j)pL# :
The optimal booking limit can be solved into the following explicit form.
Proposition 4.1.6. (Optimal Booking Limit):
a =
8>>><>>>:
0 if pL <
d
c






The optimal solution illustrates that the optimal booking limit a under
uniformly distributed random demand is increasing in the ratio between pL
and d (i.e. increasing in pLd ), and independent of high-fare price pH .
4.2 Numerical Examples
In this section, we present numerical examples to illustrate the benets of
introducing the call-back auction mechanisms under dierent settings of pa-
rameters and random demand distributions. For all the examples, we set
the capacity of the plane c = 100. Suppose that the upper bound of delay
cost d = pH = 100. In addition, we assume that both the high-fare and
low-fare random demands are Poisson distributed with parameters H and
L, respectively. In order to compare the call-back auction with the xed-
price compensation mechanism introduced by Gallego et al. (2008), we do
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the following numerical study. To make the two mechanisms comparable,
we need to make a further assumption that the upper bound of the low-fare
passenger random delay cost in our scheme is the same as the upper bound
of the low-fare passenger reservation prices in the xed-price compensation
mechanism. This assumption is reasonable since both values measure the
upper limit of low-fare ticket value assessed by the passengers. We dene the
dierence of expected revenue in percentage (R(%)) as the percentage in-






where R(a) and R(a; p) are maximal expecter revenue under the call-back
auction and xed-price compensation mechanism, respectively. Table 4.1
shows the results using call-back auction and x-compensation mechanisms
for various values of L, H , pL and pH , where L 2 f50; 70; 90g, H 2
f30; 50; 70; 90g and pL 2 f50; 80g. The expected revenue increase or decrease
from implementing the call-back auction instead of callable products ranges
from  0:3% to 0:44% with an average of 0:094%.
We have the following observations from the numerical results:
(1) The optimal booking limit a is independent of the low-fare Poisson
rate L in the call-back auction mechanism, which is consistent with
Proposition 4.1.4.
(2) The optimal booking limit a is decreasing in high-fare Poisson rate H
in both mechanisms, since the airline needs to reserve more tickets for
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Table 4.1: Comparison between Call-back Auction and Fixed-price Compen-
sation Mechanisms: Poisson Demands
Parameters Fixed-price Call-back Auction Ex. Rev
L H a
 p R(a; p) a E[p] R(a) increase (%)
50 30 72 40.5 4497.77 73 37.39 4498.06 0.01
pL=30 50 51 46 6315.76 53 44.49 6332.54 0.27
pH=100 70 30 52.4 7695.02 31 56.76 7711.43 0.21
90 8 61.7 8997.93 6 92.20 8976.98 -0.23
70 30 72 41.5 4941.65 73 38.70 4954.22 0.25
50 51 46.2 6359.41 53 44.93 6385.67 0.41
70 30 52.4 7695.03 31 56.76 7711.45 0.21
90 8 61.7 8997.93 6 92.20 8976.98 -0.23
90 30 72 41.7 5011.70 73 39.01 5034.00 0.44
50 51 46.2 6359.60 53 44.94 6385.95 0.41
70 30 52.4 7695.03 31 56.76 7711.45 0.21
90 8 61.7 8997.93 6 92.20 8976.98 -0.23
50 30 75 57.6 5496.71 76 55.37 5497.13 0
pL=50 50 55 61.9 7246.40 56 60.82 7261.26 0.21
pH=100 70 34 66.4 8286.93 35 69.45 8305.73 0.23
90 13 71.9 9183.28 12 90.18 9155.15 -0.31
70 30 75 58.7 6267.17 76 56.79 6278.51 0.18
50 55 62.3 7356.91 56 61.46 7384.74 0.38
70 34 66.4 8287.05 35 69.45 8305.88 0.23
90 13 71.9 9183.28 12 90.18 9155.15 -0.31
90 30 75 59 6411.49 76 57.24 6434.3 0.36
50 55 62.3 7357.76 56 61.48 7385.87 0.38
70 34 66.4 8287.05 35 69.45 8305.88 0.23
90 13 71.9 9183.28 12 90.18 9155.15 -0.31
50 30 77 83.1 6995.66 79 82.16 6995.75 0
pL=80 50 59 84.9 8656.54 60 84.54 8663.44 0.08
pH=100 70 40 86.9 9265.80 40 88.29 9277.03 0.12
90 20 88.7 9602.12 20 95.16 9581.10 -0.22
70 30 77 83.6 8264.85 79 82.93 8270.56 0.07
50 59 85.2 8909.59 60 85.08 8926.24 0.19
70 40 86.9 9267.44 40 88.30 9278.81 0.12
90 20 88.7 9602.12 20 95.16 9581.09 -0.22
90 30 77 83.8 8542.09 79 83.27 8556.20 0.17
50 59 85.3 8913.54 60 85.11 8930.68 0.19
70 40 86.9 9267.44 40 88.30 9278.81 0.12
90 20 88.7 9602.12 20 95.16 9581.09 -0.22
1Notes. E[p] denotes expected value of realized compensation for each vol-
unteer
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the high-fare passengers in the case when the high-fare demand rate is
higher.
(3) The optimal booking limit a is higher in the call-back auction than
the xed-price mechanism when high-fare demand rate is relatively
low, whereas the reverse is true when high-fare rate is relatively high.
The reason is that the total compensation increases faster in auction
mechanism with respect to the potential number of called back tickets.
Hence the airline will further reduce low-fare booking limit a as the
high-fare demand rate increases when call-back auction is implemented.
In Figure 4.1, we can nd that the optimal booking limit decreases
faster in call-back auction than xed-price compensation mechanism
as the high-fare demand rate increases. The reason is that airlines
would rather choose to reserve more tickets for high-fare passengers if
the high-fare demand rate is higher in call-back auction mechanism to









































pL=50 DL=50 pL=80 DL=50
Figure 4.1: Comparison of Booking Limit between Two Mechanisms
(4) In general, the performance is similar under both two mechanisms.
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When the high-fare rate H is relatively low comparing to the low-fare
rate L, the performance of call-back auction mechanism is better than
the xed-price compensation mechanism. This is because the resulting
total compensation level will be lower. Hence, when the high-fare rate
is relatively high, the performances of the xed-price compensation
mechanism is better. Figure 4.2 shows this expected revenue dierence
between the two mechanisms under dierent high-fare demand rates.






















































Figure 4.2: Comparison of Expected Revenue between Two Mechanisms
(5) The expected compensation payment to each volunteer is lower in the
call-back auction mechanism than the xed-price compensation mech-
anism when the high-fare demand rate H is lower, and is higher in
the call-back auction mechanism when the high-fare demand rate H
is high. This fact agrees with the previous observation that total com-
pensation level increases faster in the call-back auction mechanism as
high-fare demand rate H increases.
Moreover, we compare our model with a standard two-period air ticket
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booking model without tickets call-back mechanism, in which high-fare pas-
sengers in excess to remaining capacity after the rst-period sales is not
accepted. We call this a benchmark case and denote its expected revenue
function as E[RB(SL(a))], i.e.,
E[RB(SL(a))] = pL SL(a) + pH
24c SL(a)X
j=0
jfH(j) + (1 FL(c SL(a))) (c SL(a))
35 ;
where the rst term is the low-fare sales and second term is the high-fare
sales. We dene the dierence of expected revenue in percentage (R(%))
as the percentage increase or decrease from the revenue of the benchmark





in which R(a) and RB(a) are maximal expecter revenue under the call-back
auction and benchmark case, respectively. Table 4.2 reports the comparison
in both optimal booking limit a and expected revenue R(a) between the
call-back auction and the benchmark case. The expected revenue increase
from implementing the call-back auction ranges from 0:01% to 2:59% with
an average of 1:09%.
We have the following observations from Table 4.2:
(1) The expected revenue increase from implementing the call-back auction
is especially pronounced when the high-fare demand rate H is not rel-
atively high, because the possibility of bumping the low-fare passengers
will be lower, which results in a lower bumping compensation for the
airline. This trend in expected revenue dierence is demonstrated in
Figure 4.3.
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Table 4.2: Comparison between Call-back Auction Mechanism and Bench-
mark Case: Poisson Distributed Demands
Parameters Benchmark Case Call-back Auction Ex. Rev
L H a
 R(a) a R(a) increase (%)
50 30 67 4495.25 73 4498.06 0.06
pL = 30 50 46 6234.50 53 6332.54 1.57
pH = 100 70 26 7606.33 31 7711.43 1.38
90 5 8967.43 6 8976.98 0.11
70 30 67 4871.7 73 4954.22 1.69
50 46 6251.16 53 6385.67 2.15
70 26 7606.33 31 7711.45 1.38
90 5 8967.43 6 8976.98 0.11
90 30 67 4906.74 73 5034.00 2.59
50 46 6251.17 53 6385.95 2.16
70 26 7606.33 31 7711.45 1.38
90 5 8967.43 6 8976.98 0.11
50 30 70 5494.95 76 5497.13 0.04
pL = 50 50 50 7159.88 56 7261.26 1.14
pH = 100 70 30 8166.60 35 8305.73 1.70
90 10 9121.88 12 9155.15 0.36
70 30 70 6191.74 76 6278.51 1.40
50 50 7218.19 56 7384.74 2.31
70 30 8166.62 35 8305.88 1.71
90 10 9121.88 12 9155.15 0.36
90 30 70 6281.28 76 6434.30 2.44
50 50 7218.38 56 7385.87 2.32
70 30 8166.62 35 8305.88 1.71
90 10 9121.88 12 9155.15 0.36
50 30 75 6994.83 79 6995.75 0.01
pL = 80 50 56 8609.29 60 8663.44 0.63
pH = 100 70 37 9369.43 40 9277.03 1.17
90 18 9538.66 20 9581.10 0.44
70 30 75 8220.66 79 8270.56 0.61
50 56 8804.56 60 8926.24 1.38
70 37 9170.05 40 9278.81 1.19
90 18 9538.66 20 9581.09 0.44
90 30 75 8447.06 79 8556.20 1.29
50 56 8806.41 60 8930.68 1.41
70 37 9170.05 40 9278.81 1.19
90 18 9538.66 20 9581.09 0.44
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pL=30 DL=90 pL=50 DL=90
Figure 4.3: Comparison of Expected Revenue between Two Mechanisms
(2) The optimal booking limit a is higher in the call-back auction than
the benchmark case, and the dierence is signicant when the high-fare
demand rate is relatively low. Whereas the dierence is not obvious
when high-fare rate is relatively high because the total compensation
increases faster in auction mechanism with respect to the potential
number of required call-back tickets, hence the airline will choose to
further reduce the low-fare booking limit as the high-fare demand rate
increases when call-back auction is implemented. Specically, in Figure
4.4, with the increase of high-fare demand rate, the optimal booking
limit decrease faster in the call-back auction mechanism than in the
benchmark case.
(3) The performance of our call-back auction mechanism relative to the
benchmark case depends on the ratio of low-fare price pL to the upper
bound of delay cost d (i.e., pLd ), i.e., the performance is better when the
ratio pLd is high. Because when this ratio is higher, the sales from low-
fare passengers can cover a greater fraction of the total compensation
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pL=30 DL=90 pL=50 DL=90
Figure 4.4: Comparison of Booking Limit between Two Mechanisms
paid to the voluntary bumpees.
4.3 First-price Call-back Auction
In the rst-price call-back auction mechanism, the m ticket holders with
lowest bids win the auction and each of them will get a compensation equal
to the bid she submits. The dierence between rst-price and uniform price
is that the payment to each volunteer in rst-price is the submitted bid
itself, while the payment to volunteer in uniform price is identical among all
voluntary bumpees, which is the (m+1)th lowest bid. At rst, we study the
equilibrium bidding function for low-fare passengers.
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Proposition 4.3.1. The equilibrium bidding strategy by the low-fare passen-

























c DL+1  DH  c DL  a :
Proof. First, we dene the following order statistics conditioning on the high-
fare random demand and the rst period random sales:





DH = u; SL(a) = v
g(diju; v) = G0(dijDH = u; SL(a) = v);
and d
(j)
 i is the j
th order statistics of competitors' delay costs facing passenger
i. We assume that the equilibrium bidding strategy b = (di) is increasing
in di with the inverse function di = 
 1(b). Then the expected payo for the
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passenger i with bid (di) is:










































1 G( 1(b)jx; y) (b  di) fH(x) fL(y):
Then by applying the rst order condition with respect to b, we get the
following dierential equation:























Solving the dierential equation and suppressing the subscript i yields:






















































where ~G(d) can be interpreted as the probability that the order statistics
d
(DH+SL(a) c)
 i is greater than d, under the expectation that high-fare random
demandDH is between the value of c SL(a)+1 and c. Given the equilibrium














c  ~SL(a)+1  DH  c+ pL  0;
where the last inequality is obtained by integration by parts. Since the
bidding strategy with the minimum C is preferred by the airline, it is obtained









c SL(a)+1  DH  c  pL:
This condition holds because the bid submitted by the passenger i with lowest
38
Chapter 4 A Two-Period Model with Call-back Auction
possible delay cost pL is the expected value of the marginal competing bid:


















c SL(a)+1  DH  c :
This statement is reasonable because if she submits a bid less than the
marginal competing bid, the probability of winning is the same whereas the





as the airline's revenue in the rst-period
call-back auction. With the equilibrium bidding strategy of the low-fare








RF:A(i)fL(i) + (1  FL(a))RF:A(a);
















where (d (k)) denotes the equilibrium bid submitted by the passenger with
the kth lowest random delay cost.
4.4 Revenue Comparison
In this section, we examine the dierence in expected revenue for the airline
between the uniform price and rst-price call-back auction mechanisms. We
have already derived the equilibrium bidding strategy under these two types
of call-back auction in previous sections, and we assume that all the low-
fare passengers coming in the rst period follow the equilibrium bidding
39
Chapter 4 A Two-Period Model with Call-back Auction
strategy under both types of auction, hence the expected compensation to the
voluntary bumpees can be calculated based on the distribution of the random
delay costs and random demands. The relation of the expected revenue under
two dierent types of auction is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4.1. The expected revenue is equivalent under both uniform
price and rst-price mechanisms.
Proof. Suppose M = DH+SL(a) c is the random number of tickets needed
to be called back. We use m and ~d = fd1; :::dag to denote the realization
of random number M and random delay cost ~~d = f ~d1; :::; ~dag. Then for
the specic passenger i, she will receive the following compensation with the
particular the realization of random demands and random delay costs:
(1) First-price
rF:Ai (d1; :::da;m) =













rU:Ai (d1; :::da;m) =








Therefore, the expected payment to passenger i by the airline prior to
the realization of random delay cost and random demand is:
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di < d(M) i i :
The above analysis demonstrates that the expected payment to each
passenger is the same under both the uniform and the rst-price auctions,
thereby it makes no dierence for the airline to choose which auction type to
call back tickets in terms of expected revenue. For convenience, we assume
the airline chooses the uniform price as its auction type with truth-telling
being the equilibrium bidding strategy of the low-fare passengers in the fol-
lowing analysis.
4.5 Call-back Auction with Reserve Compen-
sation
Although introducing the call-back auction mechanism is a possible solution
to the oversold ight, there are still some drawbacks from the perspective
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of airline companies. For example, when the low-fare passengers' delay cost
is greater than the high-fare price, implementing auction mechanism to call
back low-fare tickets may not be protable since the earning from the high-
fare sales can not cover the compensation paid to the volunteers. Therefore,
airline companies need some mechanism to avoid over compensation to the
volunteers. In the following analysis, we examine a model in which the airline
sets a reserved compensation level r, and it will only select those passengers
with their bids lower than the reserved compensation level predetermined
by the airline. We assume that r = pH since it is reasonable for airlines to
set a reserved compensation level equals to the high-fare price. This reserved
compensation value eliminates the possibility that the marginal revenue from
selling one more ticket to the high-fare passenger is less than the compensa-
tion paid for one bumped low-fare passenger, and it is assumed that the low-
fare passengers know this reserved compensation level r before submitting
bids. Hence the optimal strategy for the low-fare passengers in the call-back
auction with reserved compensation is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5.1. It is weakly dominant for low-fare passenger with delay
cost d to submit the following bid in a uniform price call-back auction with
reserved compensation r = pH :
(d) =
8<: d if d  pHpH +  if d > pH with  > 0:
This truncated bidding function indicates that for the passengers with
delay cost higher than the reserved compensation level pH , they will rather
choose to bid an amount higher than the reserve level so as not to be selected.
The expected revenue function with reserved compensation can be written
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as:
E [R(SL(a))] = pL SL(a) + pH
24c SL(a)X
x=0




























































is the density function of (x + SL(a)  c + 1) order statistics of delay costs,
i.e., the cost of the marginal passenger (i.e., the lowest losing bid).
To demonstrate the improvement in the reserved compensation auction
mechanism, we use the following numerical examples to compare the call-
back auction mechanism with and without reserved compensation as well as
the xed-price compensation introduced by Gallego et al. (2008). For all the
examples, we set the capacity of the plane c = 100. Suppose that the up-
per bound of delay cost d = 150, upper bound of low-fare reservation prices
R = 150, and fare prices pH = 100; pL = 50 or 80. We dene the dierence
of expected revenue in percentage (R(%)) is the percentage increase or de-
crease from the revenue of the xed-price to the call-back auction mechanism
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with and without reserved compensation, which is the same as the previous
denition in Section 4.2. In addition to the Poisson distribution case with
given high-fare and low-fare rate H and L, we also consider the case where
the parameters H and L are random, as in the numerical study done by
Gallego et al (2008). It is well known (p.204 in Johnson et al. 1992) that if




 1e =;  > 0;  > 0 ;  > 0;

















According to Gallego et al. (2008), the negative binomial case can also arise
if passengers arrive following a Poisson process, and each passenger may
purchase more than one ticket, and the number of tickets purchased follows




k ln(1  p) ; k = 0; 1; 2; :::
In the negative binomial case, we x parameters L = 2 and H = 5 for
low-fare and high-fare demands, and we will choose parameters L and H
to match the mean value of the corresponding Poisson cases.
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 show the results under the call-back auction with
and without reserved compensation, as well as xed-price mechanism for
various L, H , L and H under Poisson and Negative Binomial demands.
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Chapter 4 A Two-Period Model with Call-back Auction
We have the following observations:
(1) The optimal booking limit a is greater in the call-back auction with
reserved compensation than in the standard call-back auction mech-
anism, which can be explained by the fact that the airline becomes
more aggressive in determining the low-fare booking limit when there
is a protection level on the compensation payment.
(2) The performance of the call-back auction with reserved compensation is
better than those from standard call-back auction, because reservation
level r eliminates the case when revenues from high-fare tickets can not
cover the compensation paid to low-fare bumpees, especially when the
high-fare rate is relatively high. The benet of implementing call-back
auction with reserved-compensation is illustrated in Figure 4.5.




























































pL=50 DL=90 pL=80 DL=90
Figure 4.5: Comparison of Expected Revenue between Mechanisms with and
without Reserved Limit
(3) In the Poisson distribution case, the call-back auction with reserved
compensation outperforms the xed-price compensation when high-fare
arrival rate H is relatively low. The reason is the total compensation
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increases faster with respect to the number of bumpees in the call-back
auction than in the xed-price compensation. Hence, when the high-
fare demand rate increases, the expected revenue level decreases faster
in the call-back auction.
(4) In the negative binomial case, the call-back auction outperforms the
xed-price compensation when the mean of high-fare rate is relatively
low, the reason is similar to the Poisson distributed demand case.
(5) Overall, the performance of the call-back auction with or without re-
served compensation relative to the xed-price mechanism is not satis-
factory comparing to the previous examples, because we have increased
the upper bound of the delay cost d from 100 to 150, which directly
aects the total compensation to the low-fare bumpees.
Next, we study the impact of demand variance on the optimal low-fare
booking limit in the negative binomial case. The mean and variance of the
negative binomial random variable is given as:
E[ ~X] = ;
V ar( ~X) = ( + 1):
By changing the value of parameter  and , we can modify the variance
level demand under a xed mean. In this numerical study, the low-fare
demand is negative binomial distributed xed with mean E[DL] = 50 and
parameter L = 2, since the low-fare demand does not aect the optimal
booking limit. We change the mean of the high-fare demand E[DH ] among
values f30; 50; 70; 90g and parameter H among values f1; 5; 10g, with
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parameter 0Hs are chosen to match the corresponding mean value. Thereby
the variance of the high-fare demand varies from 60 to 990. Table 4.5 shows
the results using call-back auction with or without reserved compensation
under various levels of variance V ar[DH ].
Table 4.5: Call-back Auction with and without Reserved Compensation:
Negative Binomial High-fare Demand with Dierent Values of Variance
Parameters Call-back Auction Reserved Auction
E[DH ]  V ar[DH ] a R(a) a R(a)
30 1 60 74 5454.36 74 5454.39
pL = 50 5 180 76 5374.77 76 5378.73
pH = 100 10 330 76 5341.69 77 5368.02
50 1 100 53 7054.85 54 7058.51
5 300 53 6727.14 55 6794.09
10 550 52 6401.28 56 6560.82
70 1 140 31 8015.26 32 8078.09
5 420 28 7519.51 33 7725.11
10 770 26 7154.30 35 7443.62
90 1 180 6 8860.57 11 8972.05
5 540 2 8467.42 12 8584.83
10 990 0 8151.79 14 8268.76
30 1 60 77 6935.55 78 6935.91
pL = 80 5 180 81 6841.87 82 6851.83
pH = 150 10 330 83 6698.86 86 6739.01
50 1 100 58 8389.21 59 8411.04
5 300 61 8057.58 65 8178.54
10 550 63 7743.67 70 7971.44
70 1 140 36 8918.29 40 9076.95
5 420 39 8447.65 48 8842.05
10 770 42 8109.28 54 8646.58
90 1 180 14 9144.09 22 9439.76
5 540 16 8741.65 30 9200.07
10 990 19 8434.90 37 9013.62
We have the following observations from the numerical results:
(1) The optimal booking limit a is increasing as the variance increases in
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most of the cases. This implies that when high-fare demand becomes
more uncertain and volatile, the airline tends to allow more bookings
from low-fare passengers.
(2) The expected revenue is decreasing as the variance increases in both
mechanisms because it is more dicult to have an ideal booking limit
that hedges against the uncertainty of the high-fare random demand.
Here we show the relationship between variance of high-fare random de-
mand and the optimal low-fare booking strategy as well as the expected
revenue in one-decision call-back auction model.
4.6 Alternative Information Structure
In this section, we study an alternative information structure in which the
airline releases information about the realization of random demands. In the
previous analysis, we assume that the low-fare passengers are only informed
the distributions of both the low-fare and high-fare random demand. How-
ever, the airline can also choose to let the low-fare passengers be informed
about the realized number of the low-fare and high-fare random demands in-
stead of the distributions. Hence, the low-fare passengers know the number
of tickets needed when they submit their bids. The subsequent analysis tries
to nd out which practice is better for the airline in terms of expected rev-
enue. The process of alternative information structure is indicated in Figure
4.1.
For the uniform price auction mechanism, these six situations occur:
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The information of number of 
tickets needed m=(SL(a)+DH-c) is 
released to the low-fare 
passengers
All the low-fare 
ticketws will be 
called back
Each passenger get a 
compensation of upper 





All the low-fare 
passengers can check 
in for their flight
Airline company announces the 
auction type and fare prices
Each volunteer get a 
compensation
Figure 4.6: Implementation of Call-back Action with Complete Information
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(1) DL  a, DH  c DL: The low-fare passengers do not need to submit
bids.
(2) DL  a, c DL < DH < c: The low-fare passengers submit bids with
the information that m = DL +DH   c out of DL low-fare tickets will
be called back by auction.
(3) DL  a, DH  c: All the low-fare tickets will be called back and each
passenger gets a compensation of d.
(4) DL > a, DH  c   a: The low-fare passengers do not need to submit
bids.
(5) DL > a, c   a < DH < c: The low-fare passengers submit bids with
information that m = a+DH  c out of a low-fare tickets will be called
back by auction.
(6) DL > a, DH  c: All the low-fare tickets will be called back and each
passenger gets a compensation of d.
It can be proved that truth-telling bidding strategy is still optimal for
the low-fare passengers, hence the expected revenue of the airline under the
scheme that the low-fare passengers are informed the realized number of
random demand is the same as the original scheme in which the low-fare
passengers only know the distributions of demand.
For the rst-price auction mechanism, these six situations occur:
(1) DL  a, DH  c DL: The low-fare passengers do not need to submit
bids.
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(2) DL  a, c DL < DH < c: The low-fare passengers submit bids with
information that m = DL +DH   c out of DL low-fare tickets will be








for the realized values of DL and DH .
(3) DL  a, DH  c: All the low-fare tickets will be called back and each
passenger gets a compensation of d.
(4) DL > a, DH  c   a: The low-fare passengers do not need to submit
bids.
(5) DL > a, c   a < DH < c: The low-fare passengers submit bids with
information that m = a+DH  c out of a low-fare tickets will be called








for the realized values of DL and DH .
(6) DL > a, DH  c: All the low-fare tickets will be called back and each
passenger gets a compensation of d.
Thereby, the expected revenue of the airline in the rst-price call-back
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RC:I(i)fL(i) + (1  FL(a))RC:I(a);
















The function RC:I(i) denotes the expected revenue with i tickets sold in the
rst period under the complete information scheme. To illustrate the impact
of information about demand in the rst-price call-back auction, we provide
the following numerical examples with the high-fare and low-fare demands
following Poisson or negative binomial distributions. In these examples, we
set c = 100 and upper bound of delay cost d = 150. We dene the dier-
ence of expected revenue in percentage (R(%)) as the percentage increase
from the original call-back auction to the call-back auction under complete
information scheme. The expected revenue increase from oering complete
information about random demands ranges from  0:00% to  2:04% with
an average of  0:62% in Poisson case and from 0:00% to  1:66% with an
average of  0:53% in negative binomial case.
The following observations can be made from the numerical example:
(1) The expected revenue is always lower when the airline releases complete
information about the realized values of random demand. Therefore,
the airline may not want to release complete information under the rst-
price call-back auction mechanism. Figure 4.7 shows that the expected
revenues in the call-back auction with complete information released
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Table 4.6: Comparison between Call-back Auction with or without Complete
Information: Poisson Demands
Parameters Call-back Auction Call-back Auction with Info Ex. Rev
L H a
 R(a) a R(a) increase (%)
50 30 72 4497.81 70 4496.63 -0.03
pL=30 50 51 6308.67 49 6282.80 -0.41
pH=100 70 28 7654.91 27 7635.48 -0.25
90 3 8935.03 3 8934.60 0
70 30 72 4941.603 70 4907.99 -0.68
50 51 6348.06 49 6312.55 -0.56
70 28 7654.91 3 7635.48 -0.25
90 3 8935.03 3 8934.55 -0.01
90 30 72 5010.97 70 4958.79 -1.05
50 51 6348.19 49 6312.63 -0.56
70 28 7654.912 27 7635.48 -0.25
90 3 8935.03 3 8934.53 -0.01
50 30 74 5496.86 71 5495.04 -0.03
pL=50 50 53 7230.18 51 7185.49 -0.63
pH=100 70 31 8210.29 30 8170.77 -0.48
90 8 9036.65 7 9032.30 -0.05
70 30 74 6262.02 71 6203.72 -0.94
50 53 7325.50 51 7256.42 -0.95
70 31 8210.32 30 8170.79 -0.48
90 8 9036.65 7 9032.3 -0.05
90 30 74 6399.85 71 6302.67 -1.54
50 53 7326.07 51 7256.71 -0.96
70 31 8210.32 30 8170.79 -0.48
90 8 9036.65 7 9032.3 -1.33
50 30 76 6995.47 73 6992.7 -0.04
pL=80 50 56 8625.06 54 8553.27 -0.84
pH=100 70 35 9114.16 34 9036.43 -0.86
90 13 9327.87 12 9308.33 -0.21
70 30 76 8249.48 73 8153.85 -1.17
50 56 8830.83 54 8705.64 -1.43
70 35 9114.48 12 9036.59 -0.86
90 13 9327.87 12 9308.33 -0.21
90 30 76 8503.80 73 8333.53 -2.04
50 56 8832.86 54 8706.63 -1.45
70 35 9114.48 34 9036.59 -0.86
90 13 9327.87 12 9308.33 -0.21
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Table 4.7: Comparison between Call-back Auction with or without Complete
Information: Negative Binomial Demands
Parameters Call-back Auction Call-back Auction with Info Ex. Rev
L H a
 R(a) a R(a) increase (%)
70 30 69 4479.71 67 4450.09 -0.65
pL=30 50 41 5584.13 40 5565.3 -0.34
pH=100 70 11 6779.83 10 6777.99 -0.03
90 0 8151.79 0 8151.79 0
90 30 69 4522.67 67 4486.48 -0.80
50 41 5584.28 40 5565.4 -0.34
70 11 6779.83 10 6777.99 -0.03
90 0 8151.79 0 8157.79 0
110 30 69 4526.28 67 4489.21 -0.82
50 41 5584.28 40 5565.4 -0.34
70 11 6779.83 10 6777.99 -0.03
90 0 8151.79 0 8151.79 0
70 30 76 5720.78 74 5671.78 -0.86
pL=50 50 52 6466.40 51 6421.04 -0.70
pH=100 70 26 7154.45 26 7139.41 -0.21
90 0 8151.79 0 8150.27 -0.02
90 30 76 5866.12 74 5796.07 -1.19
50 52 6470.58 51 6424.12 -0.72
70 26 7154.45 26 7139.41 -0.21
90 0 8151.79 0 8151.79 0
110 30 76 5885.30 74 5810.72 -1.27
50 52 6470.68 51 6424.19 -0.72
70 26 7154.45 26 7139.41 -0.21
90 0 8151.79 0 8151.79 0
70 30 83 7627.57 81 7551.96 -0.99
pL=80 50 63 8019.12 61 7928.0 -1.14
pH=100 70 42 8123.34 40 8071.71 -0.64
90 19 8434.91 18 8423.7 0.14
90 30 83 7991.47 81 7867.24 -1.55
50 63 8057.77 61 7957.42 -1.25
70 42 8123.66 40 8071.91 -0.64
90 19 8434.91 18 8423.7 -0.13
110 30 83 8059.46 81 7919.59 -1.66
50 63 8059.90 61 7958.81 -1.25
70 42 8123.66 40 8071.92 -0.64
90 19 8434.91 18 8423.7 -0.13
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are always less than those with only demand distribution information
released.
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of Expected Revenue between Dierent Information
Structures
(2) The optimal booking limit a is smaller when an airline chooses to
release complete information, comparing to the case only demand dis-
tribution is known to passengers. This fact implies that airline would
rather reserved more tickets for high-fare passengers to avoid the chance
of paying a large amount of compensation paid to voluntary low-fare
bumpees. The dierence in optimal booking limit between the two
dierent information structures is illustrated in Figure 4.8.
(3) The dierence of performance between two information structures is
signicant when the ratio pLd is relatively high. Because the dierence
in the rst-period revenue is signicant when the low-fare price pL is
high.
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We have already discussed the simplest call-back auction model in which air-
line only determines the low-fare booking limit. In this chapter, we consider
the airline can also determine the high-fare price, which will inuence the
potential number of high-fare demands. In this model, the low-fare booking
limit a and high-fare price pH are both decision variables. We assume that
the high-fare price pH will aect the high-fare demand DH according to the
following functions:
DH(PH) =    PH +  or DH(PH) = (   PH)  ;
where  > 0,  > 0 and  is a random variable with distribution function F(:)
and density function f(:). The former one is called additive demand function
while the latter is multiplicative demand function. In this section, we relax
the low-fare booking limit a to continuous variable for ease of analysis.
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5.1 Additive Demand Function
In the additive demand case, the following assumption is made to guarantee
that the value of high-fare random demand is between 0 and c, given the
domain of high-fare price pH is between pL and p, with p denoting the largest
possible value of high-fare ticket price.
Assumption 5.1.1. Given pH 2 [pL; p], the support of  is [p ; c+pL ],
so the high-fare demand DH 2 [0; c].
It can be proved that the low-fare passengers still follow the truth-telling
bidding strategy, thus the expected revenue of the airline with respect to the
booking limit a and airfare pH can be written as:
E [R(SL(a); pH)]













i fL(i) + (1  FL(a)) a
#

























where the rst two terms represent the low-fare and high-fare sales rev-
enue, while the last two terms represent the expected compensation to the
bumpees.
Proposition 5.1.1. The expected revenue function has the following prop-
erties with respect to the decision variables a and pH :
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(i) E [R(SL(a); pH)] is unimodal in a.
(ii) E [R(SL(a); pH)] is concave in pH .
(iii) E [R(SL(a); pH)] is supermodular in a and pH .














The expected revenue function E [R(SL(a); pH)] is unimodal in a, since the
rst term outside the big brackets is positive while the terms within the
brackets are decreasing in a. To show the terms decreasing, we take the









































Chapter 5 Endogenous High-fare Price
because d > pL, f(:) > 0 and (1  F(:)) > 0, the expression within the big































because d > pL and c >  pH+x for x 2 (p ; c+pL ).
Based on proposition 5.1.1, we have the following result.
Proposition 5.1.2. With a given booking limit a, the optimal price can be
obtained by the rst order condition:
pH(a) =
8>>><>>>:
pL if pH(a) < pL
pH(a) if pL  pH(a)  p
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We can substitute pH(a) into R(a; pH), and search between 0 and c for
the value such that expected revenue is maximized:




Next, we consider a special case where random noise  is uniformly dis-
tributed between p    and c + pL   , and the density function is
f(x) =
1
c (p pL) with mean E[~] =
1
2
[p+ pL + c  2], given the as-
sumption that c   (p   pL) > 0. When the low-fare random demand is
also uniformly distributed between 0 and c, the expected revenue function
E [R(SL(a); pH)] can be written as follows:




i fL(i) + a(1  FL(a))
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We can derive the closed form solution in the following result.
Proposition 5.1.3. (i) High-fare airfare:
pH =
8>>><>>>:
pL if pL >
c+p
2+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To further investigate the optimal booking limit and its relationship with
other parameters, we further examine a model in which the random noise is
normally distributed over [p  ; c+ pL   ]. Hence the density function
of the random noise  is












where the parameters  and  indicate the location and standard deviation
of the random noise , respectively, while (:) and (:) are the probability
density and cumulative distribution of the standard normal distribution. In
the following analysis, we solve the optimal high-fare price and the low-
fare booking limit under dierent parameter settings, where we x  = 0:5
and  = 60 in the demand function, upper bound of the high-fare price
p = 100, upper bound of delay cost d = 100 together with airplane capacity
c = 100. We will compare the call-back auction mechanism with a benchmark
two-period booking model without tickets call-back, in which the additional
high-fare passengers in excess to remaining capacity are lost. The expected
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where the rst term is the low-fare sales and second term is the high-fare
sales, with high-fare demand endogenously determined in accordance with
linear demand function as well. We also dene the dierence of expected
revenue in percentage (R(%)) is the percentage increase from the revenue





The expected revenue increase from implementing the call-back auction in
the two-decision model ranges from 0:02% to 2:43% with an average of 0:66%,
similar to the magnitude of increase in the one-decision model ranging from
0:01% to 2:59% with an average of 1:09%. The results are shown in Table
5.1.
The following observations are made from the numerical examples.
(1) The call-back auction mechanism outperforms the benchmark case un-
der the two-decision model. The improvement is pronounced when
the mean and variance of random noise is relatively high, because the
mean of high-fare random demand DH increases with the mean of ran-
dom noise , resulting in an increase in high-fare sales. Furthermore,
call-back auction mechanism provides airline with the opportunity to
capture more high-fare passengers than benchmark case when the vari-
ance of high-fare random demand increases.
(2) Similar to the case with exogenous pH , the optimal booking strategy
a is higher in the call-back auction mechanism than in the benchmark
case.
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Table 5.1: Comparison between Call-back Auction and Benchmark Case:
Truncated Normal Noise and Poisson Low-fare Demand
Parameters Benchmark Case Call-back Auction Ex. Rev




; pH) increase (%)
50 5 5 67 66.0 3609.6 71 66.0 3611.3 0.05
pL=30 15 65 72.0 3837.6 71 72.0 3860.6 0.60
15 5 63 78.0 4293.6 66 76.0 4301.7 0.19
15 60 82.0 4286.1 67 80.0 4333.2 0.65
60 5 5 66 70.0 3858.3 73 68.0 3879.3 0.54
15 64 74.0 3999.2 68 74.0 4062.9 1.59
15 5 65 84.0 4497.9 68 80.0 4536.3 0.84
15 62 86.0 4395.2 69 84.0 4501.8 2.43
50 5 5 71 66.0 4609.3 73 66.0 4610.0 0.02
pL=50 15 74 70.0 4834.8 68 70.0 4842.1 0.15
15 5 66 78.0 5292.0 69 78.0 5296.2 0.08
15 70 84.0 5288.4 76 84.0 5316.2 0.53
60 5 5 71 66.0 5049.6 73 66.0 5057.9 0.16
15 69 78.0 5189.6 79 78.0 5228.6 0.75
15 5 70 88.0 5662.2 73 86.0 5696.1 0.60
15 71 88.0 5576.3 77 88.0 5653.9 1.39
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(3) The endogenous high-fare price pH is less in the call-back auction than
in the benchmark. The intuition is that the airline lowers the price to
allow more bookings from the high-fare passengers, because it can call
back the low-fare tickets to fulll the high-fare demands.
(4) In both the call-back and benchmark cases, when either the mean or
variance of the noise increases, the response by the airline is to increase
the endogenous high-fare price pH , the eect of which is to reduce the
realization number of high-fare random demand.
Our analysis and results can also be extended to the multiplicative case,
i.e.,
DH(pH) = (   pH):
Also, similar to the additive demand case, we assume that given the domain
of high-fare price pH is between the value of pL and p, the random noise 
has a support [0; c
 pL ], with the mean value E[] = 1.
Similar results can also be derived in the multiplicative case. It can be
proved that bidding truthfully is optimal for the low-fare passengers. Thus
the expected revenue is also unimodal in the booking limit a, concave in the




In this thesis, we study an air ticket booking model in which the airline
is able to retrieve some of the low-fare tickets using reverse auction. The
focus of our research is to explore whether the introduction of the call-back
auction benets both the airline and passengers. Towards this end, we rst
developed a two-period booking model in which airline makes decisions on the
choice of auction type and low-fare booking limit. We show the unimodality
of the airline's revenue function with respect to the booking limit and use
the numerical examples to illustrate that the airline reserves more tickets
for low-fare passengers in the rst period when call-back auction mechanism
is implemented compared to the benchmark case without tickets call-back.
The presence of call-back auction also provides additional revenue to the
airline. The source of increased revenue comes from the fact that the call-
back auction provides airlines with the opportunity to capture more business
travelers who are willing to pay more for the ight. Volunteers who have a
more exible schedule will take compensation payment.
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We have also studied the bidding behavior of low-fare passengers. We
show that truth-telling is equilibrium in uniform price call-back auction, at
the same time we derive the optimal bidding function when rst-price auction
is employed. We also oer the option of adding a reservation compensation
level to the auction, in order to protect the airline from paying a large amount
of compensation. A model with alternative information structure is also
included in our paper, and we conclude that it is better for airlines not to
release complete information to passengers about the random demand. We
also extend the analysis to a more general two-decision model in which the
high-fare price is also a decision variable. The numerical study suggests that
with the control on high-fare price, which inuences the number of high-fare
demands, airlines can earn more prot than the benchmark case without
tickets call-back.
The performance of our scheme comparing to the xed-price compensa-
tion scheme introduced by Gallego et al. (2008) depends on the random
demand rate and the delay cost of passengers. The results indicate that call-
back auction mechanism would have more benets when high-fare demand is
low compared to low-fare demand, or when the ratio between low-fare price
and upper bound of delay cost is high. Consequently, we suggest that the
airline choose to implement the auction mechanism when the estimation of
the high-fare demand rate is relatively low, yet it is better to implement the
xed-price compensation when the high-fare demand rate is relatively high.
Moreover, there are several limitations in our model, which can be our
future research. First, in this thesis, we assume that all the low-fare bookings
will show up. However, in reality, it is possible that some passengers will not
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show up before departure. The problem can be formulated by adding the
no-show probability qL to each low-fare passenger. Hence the number of low-
fare show-ups in the airport is a Binomial random variable with parameter
qL and SL(a), given the low-fare sales is SL(a).
Second, we suppose that each low-fare passenger has private information
of the delay cost, which measures the inconvenience caused by being denied
to board plus the time wasted due to the delay. However, this is often
not the case. It may be dicult for passengers to estimate the total cost
of delay before agreeing on a price to sell back their tickets. Therefore,
the assumption that the passenger knows the exact value of her own delay
cost and the distribution of others' random delay cost is subject to further
investigation.
Third, it is possible to extend from a simple two-period to a multi-peirod
model. In the multi-period model, we assume that the airline sells tickets
over n periods and passengers who come in period 1, 2, : : :, n 1 can submit
a bid to indicate their desired compensation level when getting bumped.
The airline can choose to retrieve some tickets when the realized number
of business passengers coming in period n exceeds the remaining capacity.
The call-back auction is implemented to select volunteers and determine
the amount of compensation. Besides, we can also extend the formulation
to a full network consisting of multiple ights, in which the airline is able
to arrange a substitute ight to bring all the volunteer passengers to the
destination.
Finally, although this paper touches on the pricing issue, the properties
of optimal pricing decision and its relationship with other parameters such
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as low-fare price and delay cost are still not clear, so more work is needed.
Besides, in our formulation, we assume that the low-fare price pL is exoge-
nously determined, that is derived externally. However, this low-fare price
can be endogenous, that is derived within the model. Thus the pricing issue
of low-fare price pL is worth studying.
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